When a persuasive communication causes a change in belief, will behavior relevant to the belief also change? Past experiments have shown both successes and failures in obtaining such behavior change. The present study offers a reconciliation of these differences in findings by showing that the pattern of belief change with no behavior change occurred only in subjects who, before a communication, committed themselves to a position opposing it. Without this commitment, subjects showed no immunity against the effects of the communication on behavior. Some theoretical implications of this finding are discussed.
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W A THEN a smoker becomes convinced that smoking is dangerous, will he then cut down on his cigarette habit?
When a neurotic achieves some understanding of his adjustment problems, will his behavioral symptoms begin to fade? More generally, when some force brings about a change in belief, will behavior relevant to the belief also change? Although psychologists have devoted much effort to studying both change of verbal beliefs and change of nonverbal behavior, relatively little attention has been given to this question about the relationship between belief change and behavior change.'
Festinger has recently interpreted the existing evidence as indicat- Procedure. The experimental procedure was, in large part, similar to that used and described in detail in the author's previous work.6
Only the major procedural features of the present experiment will be described here.
Belief and behavior relevant to vocabulary learning were assessed at a few points during the experiment. In each case, belief scores were obtained by asking the subjects to rank eight areas of learning (including history and vocabulary) in order of importance. The belief score was the extent to which vocabulary was ranked as more important than history. This score could range, then, from +7, when vo-3 A. G. Greenwald, "Behavior Change Following a Persuasive Communication,"
Journal of Personality, Vol. 33, 1965, pp. 370-391. 4 Also described in ibid. COMMITMENT AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE 597 cabulary was ranked first and history eighth, to -7, with history first and vocabulary eighth. To obtain behavior scores, subjects were given a series of seven choices between doing a difficult problem from which they could learn something about history and doing one from which they could learn some vocabulary. (The problems were presented as learning opportunities, with answers provided, and not as a test.) The behavior score was the number, ranging from o to 7, of vocabulary problems chosen and done.
In the In the Commitment condition, the procedure was identical to that for the No Commitment condition, with one exception: the Commitment subjects were not pre-tested. Instead, they were asked to state in writing-and prior to hearing the communication-a preference for learning about either history or vocabulary. In addition to naming his preferred topic, each subject was asked to write three or four brief reasons for his choice and then to work quickly through ten practice problems-five of each type.
In summary, the design called for one group of subjects to commit themselves to an initial preference for or against vocabulary, while a second group expressed belief in the importance of vocabulary and behavioral preference for vocabulary in a fashion that avoided commitment. It was predicted that the Commitment condition subjects who were initially against vocabulary would be influenced by the communication to increase their belief in the importance of vocabulary learning but would, despite this influence, not alter their vocabularylearning behavior correspondingly. Pre-test belief and behavior levels for the anti-vocabulary subjects in the Commitment condition (who, it will be recalled, were not pre-tested) were estimated in order to test this prediction from scores of initially anti-vocabulary subjects in the No Commitment condition (who were pre-tested). For this purpose, No Commitment subjects were designated "anti-vocabulary" if they had both (i) ranked history as more important than vocabulary on the belief pre-test and (2) We must observe, however, that when the change-inducing force is a behavioral incentive rather than a persuasive communication, a different picture may develop. Suppose, for example, that, instead of being exposed to a persuasive communication, the junior high school students in the present study had been offered a penny for each vocabulary problem they chose on the behavior post-test. Under these conditions, we would expect that a rather marked pro-vocabulary trend would be shown on the behavior post-test, with no change on the belief post-test. Unpublished data collected by the author show exactly 9 op. cit.
this pattern of results.1" Thus, whereas there is behavioral inertia in the opposing-commitment-prior-to-persuasive-communication situation, there is belief inertia in the behavioral-incentive situation.12
We are left up in the air as to the nature of the underlying relationship between belief and behavior. It seems clear, at least, that there is no automatic relationship between them. The data show that the occurrence of behavior change does not depend upon the prior occurrence of belief change, and vice versa. Our safest hypothesis as to the relationship between belief and behavior is that there is, in fact, no relationship; rather, belief and behavior may be independently determined by the environment. Normally, the environment will have parallel effects on belief and behavior, so that they will appear to be correlated.
However, in special situations, such as persuasion following an opposing commitment or the offering of a behavioral incentive, the environment exerts differential pressures on belief and behavior and then they appear to be uncorrelated.
At the moment, it appears that the only simple way to account for these special situations is to imagine (contrary to common sense) that belief and behavior may, indeed, be independent. In order for future research testing this "independence" hypothesis (or alternative hypotheses) to be meaningful, it will be necessary for the researcher to be quite explicit about his use of the term "belief." Ideally, one might like to distinguish "true" (unobservable) belief from "stated"
(observable) belief, with the understanding that stated belief is a form of verbal behavior assumed to measure true belief. The reader will quickly appreciate that the assumption that true belief can be measured via the medium of verbal behavior rests upon the supposition that (true) belief and (verbal) behavior are not independent of each other! With such a conception of "true" belief, we could not test the "independence" hypothesis without assuming that it was false, nor could we test alternative ("nonindependence") hypotheses without assuming that they were (at least in part) true! It should be clear, then, that in order for future research in this area to be meaningful, it will be necessary to conceive of "belief" as a term designating a delineated set of verbal behaviors. The present point of view is that it would be most appropriate to use "belief" to refer specifically to the set of statements about the desirability of performing some action. produce some lasting changes in both belief and behavior, while the behavioral incentive seems to produce no lasting changes; in the author's research (ibid.), as soon as the behavioral incentive was withdrawn, behavior scores reverted to their original (pre-incentive) levels.
